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INTRODUCTION
Americans depend on their Social Security benefits because they
do not save.1  Individuals who have discretionary income, and there-
fore could save for retirement,2 do not save because they do not plan.
Financial planning for retirement requires both motivation and
knowledge.  However, workers under age thirty appear to lack these
qualities; many procrastinate in saving and are often not knowledgea-
ble investors.
Motivation to save and the related problem of retirement finan-
cial literacy have moved to the forefront of the national policy land-
scape due to the projected future financial insolvency of the Social
Security system.3  Under the current Social Security benefit structure,
experts estimate that workers retiring in 2030 must accumulate retire-
ment assets sufficient to replace 40% to 55% of their pre-retirement
earnings to maintain their standards of living in retirement.4  With the
future level of guaranteed monthly Social Security income uncertain
due to proposed reforms,5 it has become even more important for
1 According to Commerce Department statistics, the national personal savings rate
for 2005 was negative 0.5%, the first time the savings rate has been negative since the Great
Depression in 1933. See Joi Preciphs, Consumers Spent More in December as Savings Fell, WALL
ST. J., Jan. 31, 2006, at A2.  Demographic trends make the challenge of preparing for a
financially secure retirement a daunting one.  Due to longer life expectancies, the average
sixty-five-year-old retiree of the future will spend approximately twenty years in retirement.
See ALICIA H. MUNNELL & ANNIKA SUNDE´N, COMING UP SHORT: THE CHALLENGE OF 401(K)
PLANS 1 (2004); see also DAN M. MCGILL ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF PRIVATE PENSIONS 10–15
(8th ed. 2005) (discussing trends in birthrates, life expectancy, and growth of the elderly
population).
2 Admittedly, not everyone has discretionary income to save for retirement.  Moreo-
ver, motivating and educating workers to save and invest for retirement is not the solution
to the problem of elderly poverty and dependence on Social Security benefits for retire-
ment income.  Elderly poverty is a multifaceted public policy issue that will require a vari-
ety of public policy responses to resolve.  This Article focuses narrowly on one aspect of
overall national retirement policy, namely educating workers to save and invest for retire-
ment, and suggests how current policy on this particular point can be made more effective.
My proposal is not intended as a substitute for reform legislation aimed at changing the
“default settings” for 401(k) plans in favor of an automatic enrollment in a life-cycle fund
and an automatic increase in contributions as wages rise. See infra text accompanying notes
63–65.  Rather, I view my proposal as enhancing and complementing such efforts at legisla- R
tive reform.
3 Current projections are that Social Security outlays will begin to exceed Social Se-
curity tax revenues in 2017, and that by 2040, tax revenues will suffice to finance only 74%
of annual benefit payments. See TRUSTEES OF THE SOC. SEC. & MEDICARE TRUST FUNDS, A
SUMMARY OF THE 2006 ANNUAL SOCIAL SECURITY AND MEDICARE TRUST FUND REPORTS 1
(2006), http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/TRSUM/tr06summary.pdf [hereinafter 2006 ANNUAL
REPORTS].
4 See MUNNELL & SUNDE´N, supra note 1, at 54. R
5 Proposals for reform include increasing tax revenues by removing the limit for
wages subject to Social Security taxes or by reducing the level of guaranteed monthly Social
Security benefits through a variety of mechanisms, such as changing the price index used
for determining cost of living increases, increasing the qualifying age for full benefits, or
implementing a personal account feature that would offset future guaranteed monthly
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young workers to save and plan—using their own resources—for a
financially secure retirement.
Part I of this Article examines the mechanisms by which workers
currently save for retirement and compares these mechanisms with
national policy on motivating and educating workers to save and in-
vest for retirement.  Part I concludes that current national policy is
fundamentally flawed for two major reasons.  First, an employer-cen-
tered education delivery model, which depends heavily on voluntary
efforts by employers to provide retirement education to their workers
in conjunction with the employers’ 401(k) plans,6 ignores the growing
importance of individual account savings mechanisms that operate in-
dependently of employers.7  For individual account savings mecha-
nisms, the task of investment education has fallen, by default, to the
financial services industry through retail-level marketing.8  The result
appears to be a troubling gap in access to high-quality, unbiased infor-
mation concerning how to save and invest for retirement, with young
workers and low-income workers most likely to suffer from this infor-
mation divide.9
Second, national policy is flawed because the United States De-
partment of Labor cannot effectively educate the public on retire-
ment investing while simultaneously serving as the primary regulator
of employer-sponsored 401(k) plans.  Prior to being appointed to its
current public-educator role by Congress in 1997,10 the Department
of Labor took several key regulatory positions concerning the fiduci-
ary responsibilities of employers who sponsored participant-directed
401(k) plans under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974 (ERISA).11  These key regulatory positions, adopted in 1992 pur-
suant to Section 404(c) of ERISA,12 create an inherent conflict of in-
terest that makes the Department of Labor unable to serve as a
vigorous and effective public advocate for sound retirement investing
through 401(k) plans.13
benefits. See Virginia P. Reno & Joni Lavery, Options to Balance Social Security Funds over the
Next 75 Years, NAT’L ACAD. SOC. INS. SOC. SECURITY BRIEF NO. 18 (Feb. 2005) (summarizing
various reform proposals); see also Colleen E. Medill, Challenging the Four “Truths” of Personal
Social Security Accounts: Evidence from the World of 401(k) Plans, 81 N.C. L. REV. 901, 910–16
(2003) (describing the recommendations of the President’s Commission to Strengthen
Social Security to reform Social Security through the creation of personal accounts).
6 See infra text accompanying notes 118–128. R
7 See infra text accompanying notes 27–36. R
8 See infra text accompanying notes 79–81. R
9 See infra text accompanying notes 104–108. R
10 See infra text accompanying notes 109–113. R
11 Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
U.S.C.).
12 29 U.S.C. § 1104(c) (2000).
13 See infra Part I.C.2.
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Part II of the Article presents the twin claims of my argument.
First, workers need a national-level public education campaign to mo-
tivate them to save and invest for retirement, and the Social Security
Administration is the federal regulatory agency best suited for leading
this campaign.14  My proposal would build upon the Social Security
Administration’s “Save For Your Future” campaign15 by targeting
workers ages thirty and under.16  I propose that a youth-oriented moti-
vational campaign should employ a “best practices” marketing ap-
proach that is based upon insights from the psychological and
behavioral economics literature concerning individuals’ failure to save
for retirement.17
Once motivated to save, workers need a neutral source of high-
quality, unbiased educational information concerning how to save and
invest for retirement.  My second claim is that the Social Security Ad-
ministration should transform its role to become the preeminent gov-
ernment educational source for workers who want to learn how to
plan, save, and invest for retirement.18
I
THE EVOLVING CHALLENGE OF RETIREMENT
INCOME SECURITY TODAY
A. Changing Mechanisms for Accumulating Retirement Savings
The era of modern national retirement policy began when Con-
gress passed the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
(ERISA).19  At that time, the employer-sponsored pension plan system
consisted primarily of defined benefit plans, in which employers as-
sumed responsibility for funding their plans and investing their plans’
assets.  In contrast, the mechanisms workers use today to accumulate
retirement savings to supplement their guaranteed monthly Social Se-
14 See infra Part II.A.
15 See id.
16 Although a Social Security Administration–led public education campaign would
focus on younger workers, it could also benefit the growing number of retirees who are
receiving a lump sum payment as their retirement benefit from an employer pension plan.
These retirees face the significant challenge of managing and investing their lump sum
retirement wealth in the face of substantial stock market volatility and risks concerning
inflation, longevity, and health. See Olivia S. Mitchell & Stephen P. Utkus, Lessons from
Behavioral Finance for Retirement Plan Design, in PENSION DESIGN AND STRUCTURE 3, 26–30
(Olivia S. Mitchell & Stephen P. Utkus eds., 2004).  Transforming the role of the Social
Security Administration into an active public advocate and educator for retirement finan-
cial planning would assist retirees in meeting these difficult financial challenges.
17 See infra Part II.B.
18 See id.
19 Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
U.S.C.).
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curity income require substantially more individual effort and finan-
cial knowledge on the part of workers.
When Congress enacted ERISA, the paradigm employer-spon-
sored retirement plan was the defined benefit plan.20  These plans did
not allow workers to decide how to save and invest for retirement; the
employer funded the plan, established the benefit levels, determined
eligibility for and vesting of benefits, invested the plan’s assets, and
generally paid retirement benefits in the form of an annuity for life.21
Because pension plans were strongly rooted in the employer-em-
ployee relationship, Congress made the Department of Labor the pri-
mary regulatory agency for the enforcement of ERISA’s provisions
regulating government reporting and disclosures to plan participants,
fiduciary responsibility, plan administration, and civil enforcement
actions.22
Since the enactment of ERISA in 1974, two significant trends
have transformed the mechanisms individuals use to accumulate re-
tirement savings.  The first significant trend occurred in the early
1990s in the context of employer-sponsored pension plans, with em-
ployers increasingly shifting from the defined benefit plan to the
401(k) plan.23  Today, fully 58% of households with employer-spon-
sored pension plan coverage rely entirely on a 401(k) or similar plan
to supplement their Social Security income.24  Much has been written
about how the 401(k) plan shifts responsibility for retirement income
security from employers to employees.25  Unlike a defined benefit
plan, a 401(k) plan makes the individual worker primarily responsible
for funding his or her own retirement benefits and investing his or
her retirement plan assets.26
The second trend is much more recent and is just beginning to
draw the attention of policy analysts.  Over time, Congress has
changed the Internal Revenue Code and created many types of indi-
20 See H.R. REP. NO. 93-533, at 1–8 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639,
4639–46; S. REP. NO. 93-127, at 1–11 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4838, 4838–47;
Sylvester J. Schieber, The Evolution and Implications of Federal Pension Regulation, in THE
EVOLVING PENSION SYSTEM 11, 22–25 (William G. Gale et al. eds., 2005).
21 See William G. Gale et al., The Shifting Structure of Private Pensions, in THE EVOLVING
PENSION SYSTEM, supra note 20, at 51, 52. R
22 See AM. BAR ASS’N, EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW 38–40 (2d ed. 2000). See generally
Michael S. Gordon, Introduction: The Social Policy Origins of ERISA, in id. at lxxix–cii (describ-
ing the history of and forces behind the development of ERISA).
23 See Gale et al., supra note 21, at 55–57 (comparing the number of defined benefit R
plans with the number of defined contribution plans in 1975, 1985, and 1998).
24 MUNNELL & SUNDE´N, supra note 1, at 1. R
25 See, e.g., id.; Colleen E. Medill, The Individual Responsibility Model of Retirement Plans
Today: Conforming ERISA Policy to Reality, 49 EMORY L.J. 1, 9–13 (2000); Edward A. Zelinsky,
The Defined Contribution Paradigm, 114 YALE L.J. 451, 455–69 (2004).
26 See Medill, supra note 25, at 9–11; Zelinsky, supra note 25, at 455–58. R
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vidual account mechanisms to encourage personal savings.27  In addi-
tion to the traditional individual retirement account (IRA),28
individual savings account mechanisms now include the Roth IRA,29
two types of accounts to save for educational expenses—the Coverdell
education savings account30 and the § 529 college savings plan ac-
count31—and the health savings account (HSA).32  Although health
care costs often become a significant expense in retirement,33 individ-
uals can use savings accumulated through an HSA to defray at least
part of these retirement health care expenses.34
The proliferation of individual account mechanisms for personal
savings is also significant because worker coverage under employer-
sponsored pension plans is far from universal.  At any given time, em-
ployer-sponsored retirement plans cover only roughly half the
workforce ages twenty-five to sixty-four.35  Individual account mecha-
nisms provide a tax incentive for individuals to save that does not de-
27 See Zelinsky, supra note 25, at 485–509. R
28 I.R.C. § 408 (West Supp. 2006); accord Zelinsky, supra note 25, at 472–75, 485–89. R
29 I.R.C. § 408A (West Supp. 2006); accord Zelinsky, supra note 25, at 499. R
30 I.R.C. § 530 (West Supp. 2006); accord Zelinsky, supra note 25, at 498. R
31 I.R.C. § 529 (West Supp. 2006); accord Zelinsky, supra note 25, at 494–98. R
32 I.R.C. § 223 (West Supp. 2006); accord Zelinsky, supra note 25, at 508–09. R
33 See Paul Fronstin & Dallas Salisbury, Health Care Expenses in Retirement and the Use of
Health Savings Accounts, EBRI ISSUE BRIEF NO. 271, 15 (July 2004).  Fronstin and Salisbury
estimate that the out-of-pocket cost of health care during retirement for a person who
retires at age sixty-five in 2004 will range from $72,000 to $580,000 for coverage under an
employer-sponsored retiree health care plan and from $73,000 to $332,000 for coverage
through traditional Medicare supplemented with Medigap Plan F coverage and Medicare
Part D coverage for prescription drugs. See id.
34 Retirees can pay health care expenses using tax-free contributions and accumu-
lated investment earnings from a health savings account. See I.R.C. § 223 (West Supp.
2006).  Although under current contribution limits it is unlikely that an individual could
save sufficient amounts through a health savings account to pay for projected future retiree
health care expenses, see Fronstin & Salisbury, supra note 33, at 15, the Bush Administra- R
tion has proposed increasing the maximum contributions limits from $2,700 for individual
coverage and $5,450 for family coverage to $5,250 for individual coverage and $10,500 for
family coverage. See ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 101, 103 (2006), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/cea/erp06.pdf.
35 See MUNNELL & SUNDE´N, supra note 1, at 179; U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, NATIONAL COM- R
PENSATION SURVEY: EMPLOYEE BENEFITS IN PRIVATE INDUSTRY IN THE UNITED STATES 6 tbl.1
(2005).  The percentage of workers participating in an employer retirement plan is signifi-
cantly lower for workers in service occupations (22%), part-time workers (19%), and work-
ers earning an average wage of less than $15 per hour (35%). See id.  The reasons for these
statistics are complex and involve changes in the demographics of the labor force and the
structure of the economy. See, e.g., Susan N. Houseman, The Benefits Implications of Recent
Trends in Flexible Staffing Arrangements, in BENEFITS FOR THE WORKPLACE OF THE FUTURE 89
(Olivia S. Mitchell et al. eds., 2003) (describing the growth of temporary and contract
workers); Martha Farnsworth Riche, The Demographics of Tomorrow’s Workplace, in BENEFITS
FOR THE WORKPLACE OF THE FUTURE, supra, at 21 (describing the underlying labor force
trends that affect benefits, such as delaying full-time employment to complete one’s educa-
tion and greater workforce mobility and migration).
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pend on their employers.36  To take full advantage of these individual
account mechanisms, however, workers must assume even more indi-
vidual responsibility.  They must decide what type of account to estab-
lish, where to establish the account, how to save to fund the account,
and how to invest the funds in the account.  These tasks require both
the motivation and the knowledge necessary to save and invest.
B. The Need for Retirement Financial Education
Numerous research studies have assessed the financial illiteracy
of the American public,37 with uniformly grim results.  The most re-
36 The types of tax incentives for various individual account savings mechanisms dif-
fer.  In the case of traditional IRAs, taxpayers who meet income eligibility and other crite-
ria may make a tax-deductible contribution to the account. See generally AM. BAR ASS’N,
supra note 22, at 339–41; id. at 205–07 (Supp. 2005).  Tax-deductible amounts that a R
worker contributes to a traditional IRA are included in his or her gross income, and thus
subject to income taxation, in the year the IRA distributes the funds. See I.R.C. § 408(d)
(West Supp. 2006).  Taxpayers who meet income eligibility and other criteria may instead
make a nondeductible contribution to a Roth IRA. See AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 22, at 207 R
(Supp. 2005).  Investment earnings on Roth IRA funds are not subject to income taxation
while the funds remain in the account, and accumulated investment earnings are tax-free
upon distribution from the Roth IRA if the account holder satisfies certain statutory crite-
ria. See id. at 210.  An individual taxpayer or an employer on behalf of an employee may
contribute to a health savings account (HSA). See id. at 254–55.  HSA contributions are
tax-deductible, and HSA withdrawals used to pay for qualified medical expenses are tax-
free for taxpayers who satisfy the statutory eligibility criteria. See id. at 254–56.
Taxpayers who meet income eligibility criteria may make nondeductible contributions
to § 529 college savings plan accounts and Coverdell education savings accounts. See I.R.C.
§§ 529–30 (West Supp. 2006).  Investment earnings on funds held within the account are
tax-deferred until the account holder withdraws the funds, and if the withdrawn sums are
used to pay for qualifying educational expenses, then any withdrawn accumulated invest-
ment earnings are tax-free. Id.
The annual contribution amounts permitted for each type of individual account sav-
ings mechanism also vary.  For 2007, an individual taxpayer’s total contribution to tradi-
tional and Roth IRAs cannot exceed $4,000. Id. § 219(b)(5)(A) (West. Supp. 2006).  This
annual contribution limit increases to $5,000 starting in 2008. Id. In addition, the statute
permits annual catch-up contributions of $1,000 for individuals age fifty and over. Id.
§ 219(b)(5)(B).  For health savings accounts, the maximum contribution amount is $2,250
for a taxpayer with individual coverage and $4,500 for a taxpayer with family coverage. Id.
§ 223(b)(2).  Moreover, individuals over fifty-five are permitted additional contributions of
$800 in 2007, $900 in 2008, and $1,000 in 2009. Id. § 223(b)(3).  For Coverdell education
savings accounts, the annual maximum contribution amount per individual account owner
is $2,000. Id. § 530(b)(1)(A)(iii).  For § 529 plans, the Internal Revenue Code does not
establish a maximum annual contribution limit, but a taxpayer who contributes amounts
over the annual exclusion amount may be subject to federal and state gift tax. Id.
§ 529(c)(2).  Moreover, the state that sponsors the taxpayer’s § 529 plan may voluntarily
establish a maximum contribution limit. Id. § 529(b).
37 For a survey of the research literature on financial literacy, see Annamaria Lusardi,
Planning Costs, Financial Education, and Household Saving Behavior, in RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
IN MACROECONOMICS (P.G. Berglund & L. Ussher eds.) (forthcoming 2006), available at
http://www.dartmouth.edu/~alusardi/Papers/Planning_costs.pdf; Annamaria Lusardi &
Olivia S. Mitchell, Financial Literacy and Planning: Implications for Retirement Wellbeing 7–8,
10–11 (Pension Research Council, Working Paper No. 2006-1, 2006), available at http://
rider.wharton.upenn.edu/~prc/PRC/WP/PRC%20WP%202006-1.pdf.
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cent empirical research documenting financial illiteracy is from a spe-
cial survey module on financial literacy and retirement planning that
researchers administered as part of the national Health and Retire-
ment Study (HRS) in 2004.38  According to the researchers who de-
signed the special survey module:
Our module for the 2004 HRS . . . asks about people’s basic
financial literacy, that is, whether they understand compound inter-
est rates and the effects of inflation, along with the more nuanced
concept of risk diversification.  We find that only half of the respon-
dents correctly answer two simple questions regarding interest com-
pounding and inflation, and only one-third understands these and
also stock market risk.  In other words, financial illiteracy is wide-
spread among . . . Americans [over age 50].39
In theory, actuarial simulations show that financially knowledgea-
ble workers could accumulate sufficient assets for retirement using
401(k) plans.40  In reality, numerous studies show that many individu-
als are not saving nearly enough for retirement.41  Research by social
38 The Health and Retirement Study (HRS) is a nationally representative longitudinal
dataset of Americans over age fifty.  The HRS administers a questionnaire every two years
to age-eligible respondents and their spouses.  During each survey period, the HRS also
subjects a random sample of respondents to special survey modules.  In 2004, the special
module, which involved 1,269 respondents, concerned financial literacy and retirement
planning; the report’s findings represent unweighted data. See Lusardi & Mitchell, supra
note 37, at 3, 6. R
39 Id. at 3, 15–16.
40 See MUNNELL & SUNDE´N, supra note 1, at 28–34.  Munnell and Sunde´n show that R
under certain key assumptions, an individual continuously enrolled in a 401(k) plan may
accumulate even more retirement wealth than he or she would have received from a tradi-
tional defined benefit plan.  These assumptions include the following: that the individual
maintains a constant contribution rate and that the employer provides matching contribu-
tions of 9% (which the authors admit may be “somewhat optimistic”); that the individual
begins contributing to the 401(k) plan before age forty and does so continuously until
retirement age; that the assets in the 401(k) plan earn a constant nominal annual rate of
investment return of at least 7.6%; and that the individual does not make any withdrawals
from the 401(k) plan until retirement. See id.  However, Munnell and Sunde´n note numer-
ous research studies suggesting that, for a variety of reasons, many individuals will fail to
satisfy these key simulation assumptions. See id.
41 For example, a study using data from the HRS shows that for workers ages fifty to
sixty-one who are approaching retirement, 25% have a total net worth of less than $30,000,
and 50% have a total net worth of less than $100,000. See Annamaria Lusardi, Saving and
the Effectiveness of Financial Education, in PENSION DESIGN AND STRUCTURE, supra note 16, at R
157, 161 tbl.9-1.  A second study, using data from the 2001 Survey of Consumer Finances,
found that for household heads in their late forties and early fifties today, the median
combined balance of their 401(k) plans and their IRA assets was only $37,000. See MUN-
NELL & SUNDE´N, supra note 1, at 34–35, 36 tbl.2-5.  These results are consistent with the R
findings of numerous other studies. See CTR. FOR RET. RESEARCH, RETIREMENT AT RISK: A
NEW NATIONAL RETIREMENT RISK INDEX (2006), http://www.bc.edu/centers/crr/nrri.shtml
(“Over 40% of households are ‘at risk’ of not having enough to maintain their living stan-
dard in retirement.”); Zvi Bodie et al., Analyzing and Managing Retirement Risks, in INNOVA-
TIONS IN RETIREMENT FINANCING 3, 4–5 (Olivia S. Mitchell et al. eds., 2002) (“[P]rivate
undersaving is a major problem: U.S. data indicate that older workers’ wealth accumula-
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scientists in the fields of psychology and economics explains why many
individuals who could otherwise afford to save for retirement often
fail to do so.42
Saving through a 401(k) plan or an individual account involves a
complex, multistep decision-making process.43  Decision-making the-
ory posits that to make a “good” decision, a decision maker must first
establish a goal.44  Next, the decision maker must gather information
concerning the various options for attaining that goal.45  Finally, the
decision maker must evaluate those options and select the one best
suited for attaining the goal.46
A perfectly rational actor would flawlessly execute each of these
steps.47  Not surprisingly, however, research by psychologists and be-
havioral economists demonstrates that psychological biases and high
information costs are likely to adversely affect each of these decision-
making steps.
1. How Psychological Biases Affect Retirement Financial Planning
Researchers have identified several psychological biases that im-
pede retirement financial planning.  First, people naturally tend to
overly discount the future by placing a greater value on the present
than a rational economic actor would.48  As a result, individuals have
shorter-than-optimal planning horizons, resulting in a tendency to
overconsume today and undersave for tomorrow.49
In forecasting the future, individuals also tend to be overly confi-
dent and excessively optimistic.50  These psychological biases are par-
tions are substantially below retirement saving targets, and many retirees will be unable to
maintain consumption levels in old age.” (citation omitted)); Lusardi, supra, at 157–59
(describing the results of previous studies of retirement saving).
42 See Mitchell & Utkus, supra note 16, at 5–6 (citing various behavioral and economic R
studies).
43 See id.
44 See BARRY SCHWARTZ, THE PARADOX OF CHOICE 47–48 (2004).
45 See id. at 47.
46 See id.
47 See Mitchell & Utkus, supra note 16, at 3 (describing the behavioral assumptions R
underlying the rational-actor model); Daniel J. Benjamin & Jesse M. Shapiro, Does Cogni-
tive Ability Reduce Psychological Bias? 2–4 (Feb. 14, 2005) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://elsa.berkeley.edu/users/webfac/dellavigna/e218_sp05/benjamin.pdf
(same).  Rational choice theory, which underlies the concept of a hypothetical “rational”
actor, varies with respect to the vocabulary theorists use to describe the behavioral assump-
tions that drive the actor.  However, the common theme is that a perfectly rational actor
will seek to maximize or optimize his or her “ends,” “expected utility,” or “wealth.”  Russell
B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assump-
tion from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1060–66 (2000).
48 Psychologists describe these individuals as “hyperbolic discounters.”  Mitchell &
Utkus, supra note 16, at 6–7. R
49 See id.
50 See id. at 23.
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ticularly evident when the task involves saving and investing for
retirement.51  Both of these biases explain what researchers have long
known: that the majority of Americans do not plan financially for re-
tirement.  According to the results of the 2006 Retirement Confi-
dence Survey, only 42% of workers report that either they or their
spouses have attempted to calculate a retirement “goal” of how much
money they will need to save to “live comfortably” in retirement.52
Nevertheless, the survey also found that 68% of workers are either
somewhat confident or very confident that they will save enough for a
comfortable retirement.53
When asked to self-report the total value of their savings and in-
vestments excluding the value of their primary homes and defined
benefit plans, 53% of those responding reported assets of less than
$25,000, and 12% reported assets between $25,000 and $99,000.54
These findings are problematic because, given the trend toward
401(k) plans, fewer individuals will have a monthly annuity income
from an employer-sponsored defined benefit plan to supplement
their monthly income from Social Security.55  Thus, as retirees, these
individuals will rely much more heavily on their savings and invest-
ments to supplement their monthly income from Social Security.
A further psychological bias that adversely affects retirement fi-
nancial planning is the tendency to procrastinate, particularly when
making a decision that involves difficult choices.56  The psychological
bias toward procrastination is especially pernicious in the context of
401(k) plans.  One of the most significant reasons individuals fail to
achieve retirement income security is that they do not consistently
save for retirement beginning early in their working careers.57  Eco-
nomic simulations show that a worker who postpones saving for retire-
ment through a 401(k) plan until age fifty will have only 26% of the
retirement wealth of a similarly situated worker who has participated
in a 401(k) plan since age thirty.58  The tendency to procrastinate is
particularly acute among workers under the age of thirty, who are sig-
nificantly less likely to participate in their employers’ 401(k) plans
51 See id. at 23–24.
52 Ruth Helman et al., Will More of Us Be Working Forever?  The 2006 Retirement Confi-
dence Survey, EBRI ISSUE BRIEF NO. 292, 7 (Apr. 2006).
53 Id. at 15–16.  The 2006 Retirement Survey found that 24% of the respondents were
very confident and 44% were somewhat confident that they would have enough money to
live comfortably throughout retirement. Id.
54 See id. at 6.  These self-reported amounts are consistent with the results of national
empirical research studies. See supra note 41. R
55 See supra notes 23–24 and accompanying text. R
56 See Mitchell & Utkus, supra note 16, at 11; MUNNELL & SUNDE´N, supra note 1, at 53. R
57 See MUNNELL & SUNDE´N, supra note 1, at 31, 35–40, 57. R
58 Id. at 57.
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than older workers, either because they are not eligible to participate
in the plans or because they choose not to participate.59
The tendency to procrastinate is closely related to inertia, also
known as the problem of “sticky” defaults.60  In the 401(k) plan con-
text, the problem of sticky defaults explains why participation rates in
401(k) plans can be improved dramatically by changing the “default”
option from nonparticipation to participation in the plan through an
automatic enrollment feature.61  It also explains why workers who are
automatically enrolled in 401(k) plans tend to “stick” at the contribu-
tion levels assigned by their employers rather than increasing their
contribution levels over time as their wages increase, and tend to re-
main in the default investment option assigned by their employers,
such as “safe” but low-earning money market funds.62  Changing these
defaults to a “save more tomorrow” feature that automatically in-
creases contributions when earnings increase,63 or to a life-cycle
fund,64 can help overcome these inertia effects.  But until all employ-
ers who sponsor 401(k) plans voluntarily adopt these features, there
will remain many workers who need to make their own decisions con-
cerning participation, contribution levels, and investment options.
2. How High Information Costs Affect Retirement Financial
Planning
Retirement financial planning involves high information costs in
determining and assessing available options, and then using those op-
tions to manage various types of financial risks.65  Gathering and eval-
59 Id. at 56–57 & tbl.3-1–3-2.  Using data from the 2001 Survey of Consumer Finances,
Munnell and Sunde´n estimate that for workers ages twenty to twenty-nine, only 43.9% are
eligible to participate in a 401(k) plan, and of this group who are eligible to participate,
only 65.7% actually do make contributions to their 401(k) plans.
60 See Brigitte C. Madrian & Dennis F. Shea, The Power of Suggestion: Inertia in 401(k)
Participation and Savings Behavior, 116 Q.J. ECON. 1149, 1149–50 (2001); James J. Choi et al.,
Passive Decisions and Potent Defaults (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
9917, 2003), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w9917; James J. Choi et al., For Better
or for Worse: Default Effect and 401(k) Savings Behavior (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 8651, 2001), available at http://www.jcpr.org/wpfiles/choi_laibson_
madrian_metrick.pdf.
61 See Madrian & Shea, supra note 60, at 1158–60 tbl.IV (discussing the increase of R
enrollment rates for new workers from 50% to 86%).
62 See id. at 1170–71 (noting that three-quarters of automatically enrolled employees
remained in the default money market investment option).
63 See Shlomo Benartzi & Richard Thaler, Save More Tomorrow : Using Behavioral Eco-
nomics to Increase Employee Saving, 112 J. POL. ECON. 164, 164–66 (2004).
64 Mitchell & Utkus, supra note 16, at 33. R
65 Such risks include various types of financial risk (stock market volatility, inflation,
and longevity risks) and the risk of poor health, which can lead to extensive, unanticipated
expenses for medical and long-term care. See SOCIETY OF ACTUARIES, RISKS OF RETIREMENT
(2004), http://www.soa.org/ccm/cms-service/stream/asset?asset_id=1302091; Bodie et al.,
supra note 41, at 3–9. R
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uating the necessary information can be overwhelming.66  Choice
overload—when individuals face an excessive number of choices—is
one problem associated with high information costs.67 This problem
lessens an individual’s motivation to choose and reduces his or her
ability to commit to making a choice.68  Thus, choice overload rein-
forces the psychological biases in favor of procrastination and inertia.
Individuals cope with high information costs by employing a
number of mental shortcuts, known as heuristics, to simplify their de-
cision-making process.69  Heuristics are examples of bounded ration-
ality in which the real-world decisions of individuals differ from the
rational actor due to an inability to gather and process all of the rele-
vant information.70  Studies of 401(k) plan participants’ investment
behavior indicate that several types of heuristics may negatively influ-
ence investment decisions:
• The endorsement effect71 leads some participants to invest heav-
ily in company stock.72
• Risk or loss aversion73 explains why some participants tend to
overinvest in lower-earning fixed-income investments and under-
66 See Bodie et al., supra note 41, at 5 (“Another possible explanation for why people R
are poorly prepared for retirement is the sheer difficulty of obtaining and processing infor-
mation about the underlying risks that they face.”); see also SCHWARTZ, supra note 44, at 48 R
(“Even with a limited number of options, going through [a rational decision-making] pro-
cess can be hard work.  As the number of options increases, the effort required to make a
good decision escalates as well, which is one of the reasons that choice can be transformed
from a blessing into a burden.  It is also one of the reasons that we don’t always manage the
decision-making task effectively.”).
67 See Sheena Sethi-Iyengar et al., How Much Choice Is Too Much? Contributions to 401(k)
Retirement Plans, in PENSION DESIGN AND STRUCTURE, supra note 16, at 83, 83–87. R
68 See id.
69 See Mitchell & Utkus, supra note 16, at 9–10; SCHWARTZ, supra note 44, at 57. See R
generally Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Bi-
ases, 185 SCIENCE 1124 (1974).
70 The economist Herbert A. Simon is generally recognized as the first to identify the
phenomenon of bounded rationality. See generally Herbert A. Simon, Rationality as Process
and as Product of Thought, 68 AM. ECON. REV. 1 (1978); Herbert A. Simon, Theories of Decision-
Making in Economics and Behavioral Science, 49 AM. ECON. REV. 253 (1959); Herbert A. Si-
mon, A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice, 69 Q.J. ECON. 99 (1955).
71 See Mitchell & Utkus, supra note 16, at 19–20; MUNNELL & SUNDE´N, supra note 1, at R
102 (“The most likely explanations for employee investment in company stock are that
most people are not sophisticated investors, that employees have irrational hopes of strik-
ing it rich, and that employers encourage such investments.”). See generally Shlomo
Benartzi, Excessive Extrapolation and the Allocation of 401(k) Accounts to Company Stock, 56 J.
FIN. 1747, 1747–49 (2001); Gur Huberman, Familiarity Breeds Investment, 14 REV. FIN. STUD.
659, 659–61 (2001).
72 See Sarah Holden & Jack VanDerhei, 401(k) Plan Asset Allocation, Account Balances,
and Loan Activity in 2004, EBRI ISSUE BRIEF NO. 285, 10 (Sept. 2005); Olivia S. Mitchell &
Stephen P. Utkus, The Role of Company Stock in Defined Contribution Plans, in THE PENSION
CHALLENGE 33, 33–34 (Olivia S. Mitchell & Kent Smetters eds., 2003).
73 See Mitchell & Utkus, supra note 16, at 21–23, 25–26; SCHWARTZ, supra note 44, at R
67–73. See generally Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Deci-
sion Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263, 263–65 (1979).
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invest in higher-earning diversified portfolios of equity
investments.74
• Framing effects75 lead some individuals to allocate their 401(k)
plan account assets proportionately among their plans’ invest-
ment options (a 1/n allocation scheme in which n is the number
of investment options), even though such a proportionate allo-
cation may result in investment portfolios that are either dispro-
portionately susceptible to investment losses, low investment
earnings, or both.76
In the context of investment behavior, the above heuristics are
harmful.  Research studies of investment behavior by participants in
401(k) plans show that heuristics lead them to invest in ways that are
contrary to modern portfolio theory, which seeks to maximize invest-
ment earnings over time while minimizing the risk of disproportion-
ate investment losses.77
Individual accounts, unlike the typical 401(k) plan, provide an
unlimited range of investment choices.78  Consequently, the informa-
tion costs associated with investment decisions in the individual ac-
count setting are exponentially increased.  Recent research
concerning investor behavior in § 529 college savings plans has found
that individual investors are reducing their information costs by rely-
ing on brokers to assist them in selecting their investments.79  This
research also found that § 529 plan investors are more influenced by
retail marketing information than by tax considerations or investment
management fees in making their investment decisions.80  In short,
§ 529 plan investors are reducing their information costs by selecting
heavily marketed, broker-sold investment funds, even though those
74 See Holden & VanDerhei, supra note 72, at 10. R
75 See Mitchell & Utkus, supra note 16, at 16–17. See generally Shlomo Benartzi & Rich- R
ard Thaler, Naı¨ve Diversification Strategies in Retirement Savings Plans, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 79
(2001).
76 See Mitchell & Utkus, supra note 16, at 16–17; MUNNELL & SUNDE´N, supra note 1, at R
82.
77 See Mitchell & Utkus, supra note 16, at 13–14; MUNNELL & SUNDE´N, supra note 1, at R
79 (describing the principles of modern portfolio theory).
78 The employer who sponsors a participant-directed 401(k) plan bears substantial
fiduciary responsibilities in prudently selecting and monitoring the ongoing suitability of
the plan’s investment options. See Colleen E. Medill, Stock Market Volatility and 401(k) Plans,
34 MICH. J.L. REFORM 469, 489–96 (2001).  For this reason, most 401(k) plans offer a lim-
ited range of mutual funds as investment options to protect against unsuitable investments.
See MUNNELL & SUNDE´N, supra note 1, at 71. R
79 See Raquel Meyer Alexander & LeAnn Luna, State-Sponsored College § 529 Plans:
An Analysis of Factors That Influence Investors’ Choice 1 (May 15, 2005) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author) (noting that 68% of § 529 plans sold in 2002 were sold
through brokers, and that with this figure projected to rise eventually to 85%).
80 See id. at 3 (“Many Section 529 plan investors are not tax-savvy consumers and are
responding to what may be detrimental marketing information.”).
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funds have higher fees, and thus will result in substantially lower accu-
mulated savings over time than investment funds with lower fees.81
Although accounting for investment fees and related costs is cru-
cial to successful saving, a financially unsophisticated investor with a
short-term planning horizon will tend to disregard these factors.  Such
an investor fails to understand the time value of money and the effect
of compounding investment earnings.  This lack of investor under-
standing is not limited to the context of § 529 plans.  Since 2000, the
General Accounting Office has conducted numerous studies docu-
menting the upward trend of investment management fees.82  These
studies stress the need for regulatory reforms to enhance competition
by increasing transparency of mutual fund fees, as mutual funds are
generally the investment of choice for individual account savings
mechanisms.83
Even a small difference in investment management fees, when
compounded over time in a tax-deferred account, will erode the sav-
ings accumulated.  The Department of Labor furnishes the following
example of the corrosive effect of investment management fees and
expenses:
Assume that you are an employee with 35 years until retirement
and a current 401(k) account balance of $25,000.  If returns on in-
vestments in your account over the next 35 years average 7 percent
and fees and expenses reduce your average returns by 0.5 percent,
your account balance will grow to $227,000 at retirement, even if
there are no further contributions to your account.  If fees and ex-
penses are 1.5 percent, however, your account balance will grow to
only $163,000.  The 1 percent difference in fees and expenses
would reduce your account balance at retirement by 28 percent.84
81 See id. at 23; cf. Medill, supra note 78, at 492–95, 502–03 (describing the corrosive R
effect of investment management fees on tax-deferred retirement savings in 401(k) plans);
Zelinsky, supra note 25, at 495–96 (describing § 529 plans as “a boon to the financial ser- R
vices industry, providing that industry with another tax-favored account to promote”).
82 See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MUTUAL FUNDS: ASSESSMENT OF REGULATORY RE-
FORMS TO IMPROVE THE MANAGEMENT AND SALE OF MUTUAL FUNDS (2004), http://www.
gao.gov/new.items/d04533t.pdf; U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MUTUAL FUNDS: ADDI-
TIONAL DISCLOSURES COULD INCREASE TRANSPARENCY OF FEES AND OTHER PRACTICES (2004),
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04317t.pdf; U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MUTUAL
FUNDS: GREATER TRANSPARENCY NEEDED IN DISCLOSURES TO INVESTORS (2003), http://www.
gao.gov/new.items/d03763.pdf; U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MUTUAL FUNDS: INFORMA-
TION ON TRENDS IN FEES AND THEIR RELATED DISCLOSURE (2003), http://www.gao.gov/
new.items/d03551t.pdf; U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MUTUAL FUND FEES: ADDITIONAL
DISCLOSURE COULD ENCOURAGE PRICE COMPETITION (2000), http://www.gao.gov/archive/
2000/gg00126.pdf. See generally Medill, supra note 5, at 937–46 (describing early studies of R
mutual fund fees by the Department of Labor, the General Accounting Office, and the
Securities and Exchange Commission).
83 See id.
84 EMP. BENEFIT SEC. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, A LOOK AT 401(K) PLAN FEES 2
(1998) [hereinafter A LOOK AT 401(K) PLAN FEES].
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This example further illustrates why investment behavior incon-
sistent with modern portfolio investment theory, such as investing
heavily in company stock or failing to invest in equities, results in less
accumulated savings in 401(k) plan accounts and individual account
savings mechanisms at retirement.  Fundamentally, the investment
principles of modern portfolio theory permit investors to maximize
their investment rate of return over time, while at the same time mini-
mizing the risk of disproportionate investment losses.85  Assume for
the sake of illustration that an investor follows an investment strategy
that results in an average annual rate of return that is, to use the
above example, 1% less than the rate of return that the investor could
have achieved by investing in a diversified portfolio of equities consis-
tent with the principles of modern portfolio theory.  The long-term
financial impact on accumulated investment earnings in the tax-de-
ferred account will be the same as the impact of a 1% difference in
investment management fees and expenses.  In either case, the result
will be a substantial reduction (28%) in the investor’s accumulated
wealth at retirement.86
3. The Role of Financial Education in Improving Retirement Saving
Numerous research studies have found that even when control-
ling for disparities in income levels, there is a strong positive correla-
tion between the level of financial literacy and the amount of personal
retirement savings.87  The causal link between the two centers on the
planning process.88  Researchers hypothesize that greater financial lit-
eracy improves retirement savings because it counters psychological
biases and improves the cognitive ability of individuals to collect and
evaluate information concerning their options.89  Significantly, re-
85 See Mitchell & Utkus, supra note 16, at 13–14; MUNNELL & SUNDE´N, supra note 1, at R
79.
86 See A LOOK AT 401(K) PLAN FEES, supra note 84. R
87 See Robert L. Clark et al., Sex Differences, Financial Education, and Retirement Goals, in
PENSION DESIGN AND STRUCTURE, supra note 16, at 185, 185–91; Annamaria Lusardi, Saving R
and the Effectiveness of Financial Education, in PENSION DESIGN AND STRUCTURE, supra note 16, R
at 157, 157–68; MUNNELL & SUNDE´N, supra note 1, at 57–58; Benjamin & Shapiro, supra R
note 47, at 1–4. R
88 See Lusardi & Mitchell, supra note 37, at 14–15.  However, the direction of causality R
between financial literacy and financial planning has yet to be definitively determined. See
id. at 33 n.10.
89 See Bodie et al., supra note 41, at 9 (“[F]inancial literacy is a separate element that R
can improve the chances for success of any approach to risk management.  Knowing which
approach to take in what circumstances and, even more importantly, knowing when to ask
for additional information, analysis, and other forms of assistance, is often key to retire-
ment security.”); Benjamin & Shapiro, supra note 47, at 26–27 (describing findings from R
their research studies and concluding that individuals with greater cognitive ability behave
more closely in accordance with the rational actor posited by decision-making theory);
Lusardi & Mitchell, supra note 37, at 15 (finding that financial literacy affects the level of R
retirement planning beyond the effects of education).
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searchers have shown that improved financial literacy correlates with
higher levels of retirement savings by all workers, not just those with
high incomes.90
Much of the explanation for low participation rates [in 401(k)
plans] among young and low-income workers rests on factors such
as short planning horizons and lack of financial knowledge.  These
characteristics make participation and contribution decisions over-
whelming, and young and low-income workers often simply put off
making a decision.  All these factors can be affected by financial
education.91
How do workers today acquire the knowledge they need to save
and invest for retirement?  The most likely source of financial educa-
tion is from an employer who sponsors a 401(k) plan.92  Employers
are not required to provide investment educational materials to
401(k) plan participants, and many employers do not.93  When em-
ployers do provide such educational materials, the quality is uneven.94
Recent research also suggests that employer-provided educational
materials are geared toward individuals who are natural “planners”
90 See The State of Financial Literacy and Education in America: Hearing Before the S. Comm.
on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 107th Cong. 55 (2002) (statement of Alan Green-
span, Former Chairman, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve) (“[E]ducation can
play a critical role by equipping consumers with the knowledge required to make wise
decisions when choosing among the myriad of financial products and providers.  This is
especially the case for populations that have traditionally been underserved by our finan-
cial system.”); Lusardi, supra note 41, at 157 (finding that financial education seminars R
increase wealth, particularly for workers with low education); Donna M. MacFarland et al.,
“Money Attitudes” and Retirement Plan Design: One Size Does Not Fit All, in PENSION DESIGN AND
STRUCTURE, supra note 16, at 97, 99 (“[Financial e]ducation has its greatest impact among R
low and middle-income households . . . .”); Benjamin & Shapiro, supra note 47, at 1 R
(“[E]ven after controlling carefully for labor income, more cognitively skilled individuals
are more likely to participate in financial markets, are more knowledgeable about their
pension plans, accumulate more assets, and are more likely to have tax-deferred savings.”).
91 MUNNELL & SUNDE´N, supra note 1, at 65. R
92 See Helman et al., supra note 52, at 20 (noting that among workers who had saved R
for retirement, 72% had received materials at work).
93 Estimates vary as to what percentage of employers provide retirement planning
education materials or seminars to their workers, but studies concur that less than half of
employers provide such information, and less than half of employees receive such informa-
tion. See William J. Arnone, Educating Pension Plan Participants, in REINVENTING THE RETIRE-
MENT PARADIGM 163, 166 (Robert L. Clark & Olivia S. Mitchell eds., 2005) (estimating that
fewer than one-fifth of large employers provide a year-round, high-quality financial educa-
tion program for their employees); Helman et al., supra note 52, at 21 (noting that 48% of R
survey respondents reported receiving employer-sponsored educational materials or semi-
nars in the past twelve months).
94 See Arnone, supra note 93, at 164–66.  A study of retirement planning information R
available on the Internet found that often the quality was so poor as to be “dangerously
misleading.”  Zvi Bodie, An Analysis of Investment Advice to Retirement Plan Participants, in THE
PENSION CHALLENGE, supra note 72, at 30. R
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and that these materials do not appeal to the approximately 50% of
the working population that is not planning-oriented.95
The 2006 Retirement Confidence Survey found that among those
workers who had saved for retirement, only 15% indicated that em-
ployer-provided materials were the most helpful sources of informa-
tion in making their retirement saving and investing decisions.96
Many workers who had saved for retirement found informal sources of
information, such as advice from family and friends (13%), input
from a spouse (10%), information from newspapers or magazines
(8%), or information from the Internet (5%) to be the most helpful
in making retirement financial decisions.97  The survey also found
that among those workers who had saved for retirement, 63% had
used the advice of a financial professional, and 40% found such ad-
vice to be more helpful than any other source of retirement informa-
tion.98  The survey found that employer-provided access to
professional advice ranked higher among workers with household in-
comes of at least $35,000 than for workers with lower incomes.99
Workers with less than $25,000 in assets and workers under the age of
forty-five were more likely than others to report finding advice from
family and friends to be the most helpful source of information in
making retirement decisions.100
The results of the 2006 Retirement Confidence Survey are cor-
roborated by the results from the special survey module on financial
literacy and retirement planning administered as part of the national
HRS in 2004.  The 2004 HRS survey module showed that survey re-
spondents who were classified as “successful” retirement planners
were more likely to have used “formal” means of planning, such as
retirement calculators, retirement seminars, or financial experts,
rather than informal means such as talking with family members, co-
workers, or friends.101  The report defined “successful” planners as re-
spondents who reported developing plans for saving for retirement,
and further reported being “always” or “mostly” able to “stick to their
95 See MacFarland et al., supra note 90, at 117–18; see also Lusardi & Mitchell, supra R
note 37, at 10 (noting that fewer than one-third of the 1,269 respondents age fifty and R
older to the 2004 Health and Retirement Study module on retirement planning indicated
that they had attempted to calculate their retirement savings).
96 Helman et al., supra note 52, at 20. R
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 Id. at 21.
100 See id. at 20.
101 See Lusardi & Mitchell, supra note 37, at 12–13. R
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plans.”102  The report classified only 19% of the 1,269 respondents as
“successful” planners.103
From the perspective of national retirement policy, these findings
are troubling.  Relying solely on private sector employers voluntarily
to provide investment education to the working population appears to
be producing an information gap that primarily affects young and
low-income workers—the very individuals who could arguably benefit
the most from retirement financial education.  This information gap
is particularly problematic in the individual savings account context,
in which the substantial protections of ERISA’s fiduciary responsibility
provisions do not apply to the range of possible investment options.104
An unsophisticated investor may not fully realize that a professional
investment advisor or broker has a conflict of interest due to serving
the “neutral” role as counselor while receiving commissions or fees
from the investment products “sold” to the investor.105  The sale of
proprietary investment products is reinforced by the use of retirement
financial planning models.  These models are capable of yielding very
different saving and investment recommendations depending on
their structures and the assumptions on which they rely.106  As finan-
cial advisors refine these models to increase their accuracy, they be-
come so complex that financially unsophisticated individuals find
them increasingly difficult to use.107  At best, the result is potential
confusion over the appropriate course of action.  At worst, unsophisti-
cated investors may be manipulated into investment products that will
generate greater commissions and fees for the advisor or the mutual
fund company, but will result in less accumulation of retirement sav-
ings for the investor.108
Clearly, we need a strong public education effort to promote fi-
nancial literacy for retirement planning.  Unfortunately, current na-
102 Id. at 11.
103 Id. at 6 (providing the total number of survey respondents); id. at 11 (classifying
only 19% of the respondents as “successful” planners).
104 See 29 U.S.C. § 1003 (2000 & West Supp. 2006). See generally Medill, supra note 78, R
at 479–535 (describing an employer’s fiduciary responsibilities in selecting investment op-
tions for participant-directed 401(k) plans).
105 Under ERISA, such conflicts are prohibited transactions unless the commission ar-
rangement is carefully structured to qualify for an exemption. See 29 U.S.C. § 1108(b)(14),
(g) (2000); Medill, supra note 25, at 43–46. R
106 See Bodie et al., supra note 41, at 10. R
107 See id. at 11.
108 See Medill, supra note 78, at 492–95, 502–03 (describing the corrosive effect of in- R
vestment management fees on retirement savings); Medill, supra note 25, at 51–56 R
(describing Department of Labor Interpretive Bulletin 96-1’s guidelines for approving in-
vestment education models and the related public policy problem of using educational
materials to “steer” 401(k) plan participants into investment options that generate higher
investment management fees).
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tional policy designed to promote retirement savings and investment
by the working population is inadequate to meet this challenge.
C. National Policy to Promote Retirement Saving and
Investment
Congress designated the Department of Labor as the “lead” fed-
eral regulatory agency109 to promote retirement financial education
as part of the Savings Are Vital to Everyone’s Retirement Act of 1997
(SAVER Act).110  In enacting the SAVER Act, Congress found that “far
too many Americans—particularly the young—are either unaware of,
or without the knowledge and resources necessary to take advantage
of, the extensive benefits offered by our retirement savings system.”111
The purpose of the SAVER Act was to promote public education and
awareness of the need for personal retirement savings.112  To accom-
plish this goal, Congress directed the Department of Labor to “main-
tain an ongoing program of outreach to the public designed to
effectively promote retirement income savings by the public.”113
In 2000, I criticized the SAVER Act as merely “a symbolic ges-
ture”114 and predicted that the Act would be “unlikely to effect mean-
ingful change in the retirement savings habits of many Americans.”115
Given the dismal statistics on the national savings rate,116 this criticism
remains valid.117  Subsequent events further revealed major flaws in
the SAVER Act as a matter of national retirement policy.
109 The Department of the Treasury and the Securities and Exchange Commission
also have programs designed to promote retirement financial saving, but these programs,
unlike the Department of Labor’s, are not congressionally mandated. See Arnone, supra
note 93, at 166 (describing the Department of the Treasury’s initiative to promote finan- R
cial education); U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Beginners’ Guide to Asset Allocation, Diversifi-
cation, and Rebalancing, http://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/assetallocation.htm (last
visited Oct. 22, 2006).
110 29 U.S.C. §§ 1146–47 (2000).
111 Savings Are Vital to Everyone’s Retirement (SAVER) Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-
92, § 2(a)(3), 111 Stat. 2139, 2139.
112 See H.R. REP. NO. 105–104, at 1 (1997), reprinted in 1997 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2768, 2770.
113 SAVER Act § 3(a).  Congress expanded the Department of Labor’s education and
public outreach role as part of the Pension Protection Act (PPA) of 2006.  Pension Protec-
tion Act (PPA) of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280, 120 Stat. 780 (codified as amended in scat-
tered sections of 26 U.S.C. & 29 U.S.C.).  Under the PPA, the plan administrator of an
individual account plan is required to provide participants in the plan with a notice that
directs them to the Department of Labor’s Web site for sources of information on individ-
ual investing and the importance of diversification of retirement assets. See id. 508(a)(1).
114 Medill, supra note 25, at 50. R
115 Id.
116 See supra note 1. R
117 The U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) has criticized the Department of La-
bor’s public education campaign under the SAVER Act. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
RETIREMENT SAVING: OPPORTUNITIES TO IMPROVE DOL’S SAVER ACT CAMPAIGN (2001),
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d01634.pdf.  One of the GAO’s criticisms is that the De-
partment of Labor has not attempted to assess the extent to which its efforts have increased
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1. Misplaced Reliance on an Employer-Based Education Delivery
Model
Designating the Department of Labor as the federal agency in
charge of promoting retirement saving and investing is a flawed pub-
lic policy because it is based on an employer-based model of educa-
tion delivery.  According to the Department of Labor’s interpretation,
ERISA does not require employers who sponsor participant-directed
401(k) plans to provide educational materials to plan participants.118
Rather, the Department of Labor has determined that the statute
largely leaves it to employers’ discretion whether119—and in what
form120—to provide such educational materials.  Not surprisingly, if
an employer does provide educational materials, the quality and use-
fulness of the materials vary substantially.121  If an employer’s 401(k)
plan offers company stock as an investment option, the current regu-
latory scheme requires the employer to provide the participants with a
series of warning notices describing the importance of diversifying re-
tirement plan assets and the risks associated with concentrated invest-
ments in employer securities, but does not require the employer to
provide educational materials teaching participants how to diversify
amounts invested in company stock.122
An employer-centered education model also fails to adequately
address the growing role of individual account savings mechanisms in
the accumulation of wealth.  The most prominent example is the
the public’s knowledge and understanding of retirement saving. See id. at 3, 14.  This fail-
ure to solicit feedback from the target audience contrasts sharply with the “best practices”
approach for a public service campaign in which focus-group testing is used to assess the
effectiveness of the campaign’s message. See infra note 193 and accompanying text. R
118 See 29 C.F.R. § 2509.96-1 (2006).
119 See id. § 2550.404c-1(b)(2)(i)(B)(1)–(2) (listing the mandatory and upon-request
disclosure information that employers must divulge to plan participants).
120 If an employer does provide educational materials, the Department of Labor has
issued interpretive guidance that such materials do not constitute investment “advice” to
the plan’s participants. See id. § 2509.96-1; Medill, supra note 25, at 51–54.  For a discussion R
of why the complexities of ERISA’s prohibited transaction rules make it difficult, as a prac-
tical matter, for employers to provide investment advice to 401(k) plan participants, see
Medill, supra note 25, at 38–49. R
121 See supra note 94 and accompanying text. R
122 See 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 1021(m), 1025(a)(2)(B)(ii)(II) (West 2006).  The risks associ-
ated with company stock as an investment option are substantial, both as a matter of invest-
ment risk and human capital. See John H. Langbein, The Enron Pension Investment
Catastrophe: Why It Happened and How Congress Should Fix It, in ENRON: CORPORATE FIASCOS
AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS 487, 490–91 (Nancy B. Rapoport & Bala G. Dharan eds., 2004)
(explaining that eliminating firm risk can amount to eliminating 20% of the investment
risk in an investor’s portfolio); Susan J. Stabile, Pension Plan Investments in Employer Securities:
More Is Not Always Better, 15 YALE J. ON REG. 61, 79 (1998) (describing investment in com-
pany stock as a form of double jeopardy for plan participants due to the risk that they
could lose both their current employment and retirement incomes if their companies be-
came insolvent).
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IRA.123  In 2004, assets held in IRAs were valued at $3.48 trillion.124
By comparison, assets held in all employer-sponsored defined contri-
bution plans (primarily 401(k) plans) were valued at $2.68 trillion in
2004.125  These numbers suggest that IRAs, not employer-sponsored
plans, will be the most significant source of non–Social Security in-
come for future retirees.  Yet national policy on retirement financial
education to date has focused on employees and employer-sponsored
plans, and ignored the need for a broader-based public education ef-
fort that would address the larger pool of potential retirement assets
transferred to and accumulated in IRAs.126  Even when an employer
does provide investment education materials in connection with the
employer’s defined contribution plan, those materials are unlikely to
prove very useful to individuals seeking to save and invest for retire-
ment through IRAs.  Employers will tailor such materials to the rules
and mechanics of their specific defined contribution plans and the
particular menu of investment options they have chosen.127  In con-
trast, the rules governing IRAs are distinct, with an almost unlimited
universe of investment choices.128
In the future, other more recent types of individual account sav-
ings mechanisms, such as educational and health savings accounts, are
likely to grow in significance.129  With an unlimited array of invest-
ment choices and other financial products to choose from,130 experts
in national retirement policy are beginning to question how well
workers will be able to manage these individual account–based assets
during retirement.131
123 I.R.C. § 408 (West Supp. 2006).  Pursuant to Title I of ERISA, the Department of
Labor has no regulatory authority over individual retirement accounts established by indi-
viduals rather than through employers. See 29 U.S.C. § 1003(a) (2000) (defining the scope
of coverage of Title I of ERISA).
124 See EBRI, IRA and Keogh Assets and Contributions, 27 EBRI NOTES 1, 2 (2006).
125 Id. at 3.
126 An individual can contribute directly to an IRA and can roll over vested benefits
accumulated through an employer-sponsored retirement plan to an IRA without triggering
income taxation, provided the individual satisfies certain Internal Revenue Code criteria.
See I.R.C. § 402(c) (West Supp. 2006).
127 See generally 29 C.F.R. § 2509.96-1 (2006).
128 Compare I.R.C. § 401(k) (West Supp. 2006), with I.R.C. §§ 408–08A (West Supp.
2006).
129 For example, the Financial Research Corporation has projected that assets held in
§ 529 plan accounts will grow to $400 billion by 2010. See Alexander & Luna, supra note
79, at 1.  Assets held in health savings accounts would substantially increase if Congress R
adopted the Bush Administration’s proposal to increase the maximum annual contribu-
tion amount. See supra note 34. R
130 Such financial products would include, for example, annuities to insure against the
risk of longevity and long-term care insurance to help defray the costs of nursing home
care. See Mitchell & Utkus, supra note 16, at 27–28. R
131 See, e.g., id. at 26–30.
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2. The Department of Labor’s Conflicting Dual Roles as Regulator
and Public Educator
Designating the Department of Labor as the federal agency in
charge of public education for retirement saving and investing is fur-
ther flawed as a national policy because the agency’s regulatory role
conflicts with its public education role.  This conflict of interest results
from several key regulatory positions, which the agency adopted prior
to Congress’s enactment of the SAVER Act as part of final regulations
it issued under Section 404(c)(1) of ERISA.132
That section creates an exception to the statutory norm of fiduci-
ary liability for plan investment losses resulting from a participant’s
exercise of independent control over the assets held in his or her
401(k) plan account.133  Congress delegated the task of fleshing out
the details of this statutory exemption to the Secretary of Labor.134
The Department of Labor completed this task in 1992 with the issu-
ance of final regulations under § 404(c)(1).135  It was the issuance of
the 404(c) Regulations that sparked the subsequent rapid growth of
401(k) plans.136
In designing the 404(c) Regulations, the Department of Labor
was forced to strike a balance among ERISA’s three competing policy
objectives.  Congress’s primary goal in enacting ERISA was to protect
the rights and benefits of plan participants (the “benefit protection”
policy).137  Congress also had two secondary policy objectives in enact-
132 29 U.S.C. § 1104(c)(1) (2000).  That provision states:
In the case of a pension plan which provides for individual accounts and
permits a participant or beneficiary to exercise control over the assets in his
account, if a participant or beneficiary exercises control over the assets in
his account (as determined under regulations of the Secretary)–
(A) such participant or beneficiary shall not be deemed to be a fiduciary by
reason of such exercise, and
(B) no person who is otherwise a fiduciary shall be liable under this part for
any loss, or by reason of any breach, which results from such participant’s
or beneficiary’s exercise of control.
Id.
133 See H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 93-1280, at 305 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5038,
5085–86; 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1(a), (d)(2) (2006); Participant Directed Individual Ac-
count Plans, 57 Fed. Reg. 46,906, 46,924–25 (Oct. 13, 1992) (codified at 29 C.F.R. pt.
2550); Medill, supra note 25, at 33–35. R
134 See 29 U.S.C. § 1104(c)(1) (2000).
135 See Participant Directed Individual Account Plans, 57 Fed. Reg. at 46,906.
136 See Pamela Perun & C. Eugene Steuerle, From Fiduciary to Facilitator: Employers and
Defined Contribution Plans, in THE EVOLVING PENSION SYSTEM, supra note 20, at 194–99. R
137 See Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 488, 497 (1996); H.R. REP. NO. 93-533, at 1–10
(1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4639–47; S. REP. NO. 93-127, at 1–15 (1973),
reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4838, 4838–51; Colleen E. Medill, Resolving the Judicial Para-
dox of “Equitable” Relief Under ERISA Section 502(a)(3), 39 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 827, 919
(2006) (describing ERISA’s three competing policy goals as forming a triangular relation-
ship, with the “benefit protection” policy assuming the primary position at the top of the
triangle).
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ing ERISA.  One such objective was to avoid imposing undue adminis-
trative burdens on employers that would discourage them from
voluntarily sponsoring benefit plans for their workers (the “cost mini-
mization” policy).138  The other secondary policy objective was to pre-
serve the right of each employer, as the sponsor of its plan, to
customize the design of the plan (within the limits that Title I of ER-
ISA established)139 to suit the needs of the employer’s business, partic-
ularly with respect to the employer’s workforce and budget (the
“settlor function” policy).140  Where these policies conflicted, Con-
gress attempted, in crafting ERISA’s statutory scheme, to strike an ap-
propriate balance between the competing policy objectives.141
Similarly, to effectuate congressional intent in crafting the 404(c)
Regulations, the Department of Labor attempted to reconcile the
sometimes competing objectives of the benefit protection policy, the
cost minimization policy, and the settlor function policy.  The result
was a series of compromises on three key issues concerning the ERISA
fiduciary obligations of employers who sponsor participant-directed
401(k) plans:
1) Employers are not required to provide investment advice142 or
investment education143 to workers in connection with a partici-
pant-directed 401(k) plan.
2) Employers are not absolutely required to provide participants in
their 401(k) plans with a comparative description of the invest-
ment management fees and other charges that may reduce the
rate of return for each investment option available under the
plans.144  Rather, an employer must provide this information
138 See Howe, 516 U.S. at 497; Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 261–63 (1993);
H.R. REP. NO. 93-533, at 1–10, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4639–47; S. REP. NO. 93-
127, at 1–15, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4838–51; Medill, supra note 137, at 919 R
(describing the cost minimization policy as half of the supporting base of the ERISA policy
triangle).
139 Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88
Stat. 829 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 & 29 U.S.C.).
140 See Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 525 U.S. 432, 443 (1999); Lockheed Corp. v.
Spink, 517 U.S. 882, 889–91 (1996); Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Schoonejongen, 514 U.S. 73,
78 (1995); Medill, supra note 137, at 919 (describing the settlor function policy as the other R
half of the supporting base of the ERISA policy triangle).
141 See Aetna Health, Inc., v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 214–16 (2004); Mertens, 508 U.S. at
262–63; Medill, supra note 137, at 920–21 (explaining why the cost minimization and set- R
tlor function policies that form the base of the ERISA policy triangle are necessary to sup-
port the primary policy goal of benefit protection, due to the voluntary nature of plan
sponsorship by employers).
142 See 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1(c)(4) (2006); Participant Directed Individual Account
Plans, 57 Fed. Reg. 49,906, 46,922 (Oct. 13, 1992) (codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2550).
143 See id. § 2550.404c-1(b)(2)(i)(B)(1)–(2) (listing the mandatory and upon-request
disclosure information that employers must divulge to plan participants).
144 See id. § 2550.404c-1(b)(2)(i)(B)(1) (listing mandatory disclosure information that
employers must divulge to plan participants).  Investment management fees, which lower
the rate of return for the investment option, account for 75% to 90% of the total expenses
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only if a participant affirmatively requests the information.145
Furthermore, employers are not required to explain to partici-
pants how even a slightly higher investment management fee,
compounded over time, can significantly reduce their account
balances at retirement.146
3) Publicly traded companies may offer company stock as an invest-
ment option in their 401(k) plans.147
The resolution of each of these regulatory issues is justifiable as a
compromise necessary to encourage employers to sponsor participant-
directed 401(k) plans.  The first two regulatory positions reduce the
administrative costs for an employer who sponsors a plan.  The third
position is consistent with the settlor function policy and, in particu-
lar, the publicly traded companies’ desire—for a variety of business
reasons148—to offer their workers the option of investing in company
stock through the employers’ 401(k) plans.
These three key regulatory positions cannot, however, be recon-
ciled with the need to provide workers with a vigorous and effective
public educator.  For example, effectively educating workers to de-
mand more and better information would ultimately lead to greater
administrative burdens on their employers as the sponsors of the
plans.  Additionally, educating workers to understand the impact of
even a small difference in investment management fees, while benefi-
cial to workers in increasing their ability to understand and control
their financial options,149 could very well lead more workers to chal-
lenge their employers’ fiduciary decisions to select investment options
with relatively high investment management fees.150  This type of scru-
participants pay in connection with their 401(k) plan accounts. See MUNNELL & SUNDE´N,
supra note 1, at 76; see also A LOOK AT 401(K) PLAN FEES, supra note 84 (describing invest- R
ment management fees as “[b]y far the largest component of 401(k) plan fees”).
145 See 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1(b)(2)(i)(B)(2)(i)–(ii) (2006).
146 See id. § 2550.404c-1(b)(2)(i)(B)(1)–(2).  For an illustration of the impact of invest-
ment management fees over time, see supra note 84 and accompanying text. R
147 See id. § 2550.404c-1(d)(2)(ii)(E)(4); Participant Directed Individual Account
Plans, 57 Fed. Reg. at 46,919; Medill, supra note 78, at 524–25 (noting that employers can R
offer company stock as part of 401(k) plans and that certain procedural safeguards protect
the participants’ confidentiality with respect to the purchase, sale, and holding of company
stock).
148 See Mitchell & Utkus, supra note 72, 46–50 (describing reasons employers give for R
offering company stock as a 401(k) plan investment option); MUNNELL & SUNDE´N, supra
note 1, at 106–11 (describing reasons employers give for offering company stock as a R
401(k) plan investment option).
149 See ADVISORY COUNCIL ON EMPLOYEE WELFARE & PENSION BENEFIT PLANS, REPORT OF
THE WORKING GROUP ON FEE AND RELATED DISCLOSURES TO PARTICIPANTS 5 (2004), available
at http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/ac_111704_report.pdf (concluding that the Department
of Labor should make the requirements of 404(c) Regulations concerning the disclosure
of investment management fees more “user friendly”).
150 See Medill, supra note 78, at 481–95 (describing an employer’s fiduciary duty of R
prudence under ERISA in selecting 401(k) plan investment options and discussing the
standards federal courts use to judge employer conduct in 401(k) fiduciary litigation).
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tiny might make some employers reluctant to continue sponsoring
401(k) plans.  This outcome seems particularly likely if an employer
opts for funds with higher investment management fees in ex-
change—directly or indirectly—for lower employer-paid direct ad-
ministrative costs.151  Educating workers about the risks associated
with company stock as a retirement investment option would discour-
age them from accepting this stock as an investment option and un-
dermine the incentives for some large publicly traded employers to
sponsor 401(k) plans.152  In short, a vigorous and effective public edu-
cation program would undo the key policy compromises that the De-
partment of Labor made in the 404(c) Regulations.
When viewed in light of recent research, these three regulatory
positions are striking because they reinforce the psychological biases
against saving and investing for retirement.  Without improved finan-
cial literacy, many workers will simply be unwilling to cope with the
high information costs associated with selecting investments and will
likely turn to heuristics instead.153  Procrastination and inertia will
lead many workers never to affirmatively ask for comparative informa-
tion concerning investment management fees or other expenses asso-
ciated with the 401(k) plans investment options.154  If workers do
request such information, the financially unsophisticated will tend to
discount the future and, as a result, substantially underestimate the
impact that even a small difference in investment management fees
will have on their 401(k) plan account balances at retirement.155  Fi-
nally, when financially unsophisticated workers are faced with high in-
formation costs and overloaded with a choice of investment options,
some of these workers may rely on their employers’ tacit endorse-
ments of company stock as a sound retirement investment rather than
making informed choices.156
In fairness to the Department of Labor, these regulatory policy
decisions were made in 1992 when the agency’s only role was its regu-
latory role under ERISA.  It was only later, through the SAVER Act of
1997,157 that Congress directed the Department of Labor to assume a
151 See Mitchell & Utkus, supra note 72, at 46–50; MUNNELL & SUNDE´N, supra note 1, at R
106–11; Medill, supra note 78, at 503 (describing a 1998 Department of Labor study of fees R
and expenses in 401(k) plans demonstrating that employers make this kind of “high fees
for lower costs” decision).
152 See Mitchell & Utkus, supra note 72, at 36–40 (listing well-known U.S. companies R
with very high concentrations of company stock held in 401(k) and other defined contri-
bution plans).
153 See Mitchell & Utkus, supra note 16, at 9–10. R
154 See supra notes 56–62 and accompanying text. R
155 See supra notes 48 and accompanying text. R
156 See supra notes 71–72 and accompanying text. R
157 Savings Are Vital to Everyone’s Retirement (SAVER) Act of 1997, 29 U.S.C.
§ 1146–47 (2000).
\\server05\productn\C\CRN\92-2\CRN207.txt unknown Seq: 26 26-DEC-06 15:55
348 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92:323
dual role as both the regulator of 401(k) plans and public educa-
tor.158  Although the conflict between these two concurrent roles may
not have been readily apparent in 1997, subsequent research studies
of investment behavior159 have illuminated the magnitude of the con-
flict.  These studies demonstrate that although the employer-spon-
sored retirement plan system has increasingly shifted responsibility for
achieving retirement income security to individual workers, many
workers are ill-prepared to assume this responsibility.160  Under the
status quo, “planning for retirement is difficult, few do it, and fewer
still think they get it right.”161
In summary, policymakers today face a dilemma: either continue
with the status quo, or respond proactively to the fundamental trends
that now characterize how workers accumulate wealth to generate in-
come during their retirement years.  To maintain the status quo and
ignore the empirical evidence of widespread financial illiteracy and
lack of retirement financial planning among American workers is to
ignore the logical future consequence of these trends: widespread eld-
erly poverty as the result of dependence on Social Security benefits as
the sole source of retirement income.  To prevent this unacceptable
outcome, we must develop new ideas and a new policy approach.
II
TRANSFORMING THE ROLE OF THE SOCIAL
SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
A. Motivating Workers to Save: Building on the “Save for Your
Future” Campaign
Changing the status quo will require the federal government to
assume a much more proactive role in promoting financial literacy
among workers.  Currently, there are four federal regulatory agencies
involved in educating the public to save and invest for retirement.  In
addition to the Department of Labor, the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) and the Department of the Treasury also have
public education initiatives,162 as does the Social Security
Administration.163
158 See supra notes 109–113 and accompanying text.  Congress subsequently expanded R
the Department of Labor’s dual educational role in the Pension Protection Act of 2006.
See discussion supra note 113. R
159 See discussion supra Part I.B.1–2.
160 See discussion supra Part I.B.
161 Lusardi & Mitchell, supra note 37, at 11. R
162 See MacFarland et al., supra note 90, at 98 & n.1. R
163 See Press Release, Soc. Sec. Admin., The Social Security Administration and the
American Savings Education Council Announce National “Save for Your Future” Cam-
paign (May 17, 2002) (on file with author).
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The Department of Labor, the Department of the Treasury,164
and the SEC165 have primarily regulatory roles with respect to em-
ployer-sponsored retirement plans, the mutual fund industry, and the
tax-paying public, respectively.  Of the “Big Four” federal regulatory
agencies, only the Social Security Administration does not also have a
direct regulatory role (and thus, some potential for conflicts of inter-
est or industry capture) with respect to some aspect of the private sec-
tor components of the national retirement system.166
Because it is not subject to conflicts of interest or capture, the
Social Security Administration is the federal regulatory agency best
suited to lead a national campaign to motivate and educate the work-
ing population to save and invest for retirement.  I propose to target
this public education campaign, at least initially, at workers ages thirty
and under.  This target demographic group is both the most likely to
benefit from improved financial literacy and the most likely to need to
rely heavily on personal financial assets for retirement income secur-
ity.  It is young workers who, given the motivation and sufficient
knowledge, have the greatest ability to restore the Social Security sys-
tem to what it was intended to be: a portion, not the sole source, of
one’s retirement income.
Implementing this proposal would require transforming the So-
cial Security Administration from a passive payer of retirement bene-
fits to retirees into a proactive educator and advocate for personal
retirement financial planning by young workers.  This transformation
appears to have already begun with the Social Security Administra-
tion’s “Save for Your Future Campaign,” launched in 2001.167  Part of
this campaign involves a partnership with the American Savings Edu-
cation Council168 to better educate consumers to prepare financially
for retirement.169  The “Save for Your Future Campaign” is built
around the following four decision-making steps:
164 See generally I.R.C. (2000); Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of
1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
U.S.C.); 1978 Reorganization Plan No. 4, 43 Fed. Reg. 47,713 (Oct. 17, 1978) (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1001).
165 See generally Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to -52 (2000);
Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to -21 (2000).
166 See generally Social Security Act of 1935, ch. 531, 49 Stat. 620 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
167 Fact Sheet, Soc. Sec. Admin., “National Save for Your Future” Campaign (Oct.
2001) (on file with author).
168 The American Savings Education Council (ASEC) is “a national coalition of public-
and private sector institutions” funded by the EBRI Education and Research Fund, a non-
profit organization. AM. SAV. EDUC. COUNCIL, AMERICAN SAVINGS EDUCATION COUNCIL
(ASEC) FACT SHEET (2005), http://www.choosetosave.org/asec/factsheet.pdf.
169 See Press Release, Soc. Sec. Admin, supra note 163. R
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1. Calculate the financial amount you need for your retirement
goal.
2. Plan how to accumulate money to reach your goal.
3. Act to implement your financial plan.
4. Reassess your financial needs and your plan annually when you
receive your personal Social Security statement.170
The personal Social Security statement described in the fourth step is
sent automatically each year to every worker age twenty-five and
older.171  This statement estimates the worker’s projected Social Se-
curity benefit amount at retirement based on current earnings, ac-
companied by a prominent disclaimer highlighted by bold print and
an asterisk that states:
Your estimated benefits are based on current law.  Congress has
made changes to the law in the past and can do so at any time.  The
law governing benefit amounts may change because, by 2040, the
payroll taxes collected will be enough to pay only about 74 percent
of scheduled benefits.172
As a motivational tool for workers, the annual personal Social Se-
curity statement in its current form is probably not worth the costs of
paper and postage.  Yet, this is the only piece of information about
planning for retirement that every worker over age twenty-five receives
each year.173  To make this statement part of an effective public edu-
cation campaign targeting young workers, the Social Security Admin-
istration can learn from the truthSM smoking prevention campaign—
an award-winning, highly successful marketing strategy employed in
an analogous public education effort designed to change behavior in
young people.
B. A “Best Practices” Motivational Approach: Lessons from the
TruthSM Campaign
At least one researcher has noted the psychological similarities
between encouraging individuals to save for retirement and encourag-
ing individuals not to engage in high-risk health behaviors, such as
smoking.174  Persuading youths not to smoke, just like persuading
young workers to save, is difficult due to the following tendencies:
1. to procrastinate (I’ll start saving or stop smoking tomorrow),
170 EBRI, SAVE FOR YOUR FUTURE BOOKLET 3, http://www.saveforyourfuture.org/
brochures/pdf/sfyfbooklet.pdf (last visited Oct. 20, 2006).
171 See 20 C.F.R. § 404.812 (2006).
172 SOC. SEC. ADMIN., YOUR SOCIAL SECURITY STATEMENT 2 (2006), http://www.ssa.gov/
mystatement/07currentstatement.pdf.
173 See 20 C.F.R. § 404.812 (2006).
174 See Gary W. Selnow, Motivating Retirement Planning: Problems and Solutions, in PEN-
SION DESIGN AND STRUCTURE, supra note 16, at 48. R
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2. to be overly optimistic (I’ll be rich by the time I retire or I will
never die of lung cancer), and
3. to overvalue the present and discount the future (I want to spend
or smoke now, and will deal with the future consequences later).
Granted, there are obvious differences between saving and smok-
ing.  Smoking can result in an addiction to nicotine; saving does not
cause addiction.  Saving requires an affirmative decision and resulting
action; to prevent someone from ever taking up smoking requires a
decision on his or her part not to begin.  But the psychological biases
at work in both situations are similar enough that it is worthwhile to
consider the marketing elements that made the American Legacy
Foundation’s truthSM campaign effective in addressing these biases.
The American Legacy Foundation was established in 1999 as part
of the landmark Master Settlement Agreement (“Settlement”) that
settled forty-six states’ lawsuits against the tobacco industry.175  As part
of the Settlement, the tobacco industry agreed to provide $1.45 billion
from 1999 to 2003 to fund the establishment of the American Legacy
Foundation.176  The foundation is a charitable organization devoted
to educating the public about the dangers of tobacco use.177  Because
funding would likely have ended in 2004 due to the terms of the Set-
tlement, most of the awarded funds were endowed,178 but $100 mil-
lion was used to finance the truthSM campaign.179
Before the formation of the American Legacy Foundation, sev-
eral factors hampered public education efforts aimed at reducing the
number of smokers.  The problems plaguing the earlier antismoking
efforts bear striking similarities to those affecting the current state of
public financial education directed at promoting saving.  First, the to-
bacco-control community consisted of multiple organizations with a
myriad of perspectives and messages.180  As a result, the organizations
produced a fragmented and uncoordinated public message, and
wasted energy and money in the process.181  Second, the marketing
expenditures of the tobacco industry in promoting its product
dwarfed the amount of funding available to the organizations in the
175 See Youngme Moon, American Legacy: Beyond the Truth Campaign, Harv. Bus. Sch.
Case Study 4 (2005).
176 See id. at 5.
177 See id. at 1, 4.
178 See id. at 5, 14.
179 See id. at 9.
180 See id. at 3.
181 The failures of the tobacco control community parallel the public education efforts
concerning retirement saving by the Department of Labor, the Securities and Exchange
Commission, the Department of the Treasury, the Social Security Administration, and nu-
merous private organizations.
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tobacco-control community.182  Third, the tobacco-control commu-
nity relied on public service announcements that were ineffective be-
cause the announcements told the public what it already knew: that
smoking is a health hazard.183
The American Legacy Foundation’s truthSM campaign was based
on the success of an earlier truth-oriented campaign by the Florida
Department of Health.184  The American Legacy Foundation took the
basic premise of the Florida campaign, which used hard-hitting
messages that deglamorized smoking and portrayed teenagers con-
fronting the tobacco industry, and developed the concept into a
highly sophisticated public education campaign.185  The result set a
new standard for “best practices” in developing an effective public ed-
ucation campaign.  These best practices are as follows:
Develop a specific target audience.  The American Legacy Foundation
decided to target youths ages twelve to seventeen and to focus its pub-
lic education effort on the prevention of smoking among this group,
rather than diluting its message by trying to appeal to a broader audi-
ence.186  The foundation selected this demographic group based on
scientific evidence showing that teenagers had the highest incidence
of starting smoking.187  Furthermore, the foundation perceived that
this group was particularly vulnerable to cigarette marketing.188
Review the psychological research concerning the behavior of the target
audience.  The American Legacy Foundation determined that teenag-
ers with “sensation-seeking” personalities were the most likely to be-
come addicted to tobacco, and used this research in designing the
marketing message for its campaign.189
Hire professionals to develop the creative side of the campaign.  The
American Legacy Foundation hired two well-respected advertising
agencies, Arnold Worldwide and Crispin Porter + Bogusky, to develop
182 See Moon, supra note 175, at 3.  The tobacco industry’s marketing efforts are analo- R
gous to those of the financial services industry, but directed toward attracting smokers
rather than investors.
183 See id. Given that research shows that workers know they should save for retirement,
the tobacco control community’s experience with public service announcements telling
the public what they already knew should inform the primary reliance on similar types of
public service announcements to promote retirement saving. See Helman et al., supra note
52, at 5 (noting that although “[a] majority of Americans appear to be persuaded about R
the need to set aside money to prepare for retirement . . . [l]ess than two-thirds of workers
report that they and/or their spouse are currently saving for retirement”).
184 See Press Release, Am. Pub. Health Ass’n, New Study in the American Journal of
Public Health Shows Philip Morris’s Anti-Smoking Ads Make Kids More Likely to Smoke
(May 30, 2002), available at http://www.apha.org/news/press/2002/truth.htm.
185 See id.
186 See Moon, supra note 175, at 5. R
187 See id.  More than 80% of smokers start before the age of eighteen. See id.
188 See id.
189 See id. at 6.
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the creative side of the campaign.190  Hiring professional marketing
agencies was unique for a public service campaign.  Traditionally,
public service campaigns depend on pro bono marketing services due
to the financial constraints inherent in such campaigns.
Develop a brand with which the target audience can identify.  Based on
the advice of its professional advertising agencies, the American Leg-
acy Foundation decided to discard the standard formula for public
service announcements, which typically focused on a public health
and safety message.191  Instead, the foundation decided to build a sym-
bolic brand, the truth,SM with which its target audience could
identify.192
Use peer focus groups to test and refine the marketing message, and use the
appropriate media for dissemination.  The American Legacy Foundation
extensively used peer focus groups to test the target audience’s reac-
tion to various marketing messages and to determine the most effec-
tive messages.193  Rather than using public service announcement
time slots, the campaign purchased advertising time during national
television shows and placed advertisements in national magazines that
its target audience watched and read.194  A national-media purchase
approach for advertising, rather than a market-to-market purchase ap-
proach, saved the campaign approximately 40% in advertising
dollars.195
Inform (don’t preach).  Based on the psychological research of the
target audience, the American Legacy Foundation decided that bla-
tantly telling teenagers not to smoke would be counterproductive.196
Instead, the message communicated was purely informational but
used straightforward language and stark, graphic images about death
and disease caused by tobacco usage.197  The other key theme of the
campaign was an expose´ of “Big Tobacco’s” manipulative marketing
practices.198  The purpose of this expose´ was to raise awareness among
the teenage audience so that they would not be “duped” by tobacco
industry advertising.199
Subsequent scientific research studies, published in a peer-re-
viewed medical journal, later proved that the truthSM campaign ac-
190 See id.
191 See id.
192 See id.
193 See id. at 7.
194 See id. at 9.
195 Matthew C. Farrelly et al., Evidence of a Dose-Response Relationship Between “Truth”
Antismoking Ads and Youth Smoking Prevalence, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 425, 425 (2005).
196 See Moon, supra note 175, at 4. R
197 See id. at 9.
198 See id.
199 See id.
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counted for a significant decline in youth smoking.200  The truthSM
campaign also won a number of advertising industry awards, including
the prestigious Grand EFFIE for Most Effective Advertising Campaign
of 2002, Campaign of the Year for 2000 from Adweek, Grand Prize at
the London International Awards for Public Service TV in 2000, and
an Emmy award in 2005 for public service advertising.201
The truthSM campaign illustrates a powerful, new, sophisticated,
scientific marketing approach to public education aimed at changing
the behavior of young people.  Although the audience and the mes-
sage are different, the methodology used in developing and imple-
menting the truthSM campaign is transferable to the retirement saving
dilemma.
The Social Security Administration should carefully study this
methodology to develop an effective campaign to motivate workers
under the age of thirty to save and invest for retirement.  In develop-
ing such a campaign, the Social Security Administration would have
one valuable resource that the American Legacy Foundation did not
have: access to direct public communication.  The administration al-
ready communicates, via an annual personal Social Security state-
ment, with every worker over the age of twenty-five.202  To avoid
wasting this opportunity, the Administration should redesign the per-
sonal Social Security statements sent to these workers to create a more
effective motivational tool for retirement saving.  A further, more am-
bitious step would be to coordinate a retooled personal Social Security
statement with the development of the Social Security Administration
as the preeminent government source for public information and ed-
ucation on retirement financial planning.  Such a coordinated initia-
tive would represent a bold change for national retirement policy.
C. The Social Security Administration as the Preeminent Source
for Public Information and Education on Retirement
Financial Planning
A national policy based solely on motivating workers to plan fi-
nancially for retirement is inadequate.  Once motivated to save, work-
ers need a neutral source of high-quality, unbiased educational
information on how to save and invest for retirement.  The Social Se-
curity Administration should be transformed to serve this role.
Given that Congress previously assigned this public education
task to the Department of Labor in the SAVER Act203 and further ex-
panded the Department’s public education role in the Pension Pro-
200 See Farrelly et al., supra note 195, at 429. R
201 See Moon, supra note 175, at 12. R
202 See 20 C.F.R. § 404.812 (2006).
203 See supra notes 109–113 and accompanying text. R
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tection Act of 2006,204 one may argue that change is unnecessary.
However, there are several reasons for changing the role of the Social
Security Administration.  First, the last of the three national retire-
ment summits authorized by the SAVER Act205 has been completed.206
Therefore, Congress should reevaluate whether the Department of
Labor should continue educating the public on retirement saving, or
whether another federal agency may be better suited to this role.  Sec-
ond, since the enactment of the SAVER Act in 1997, the mechanisms
by which individuals accumulate wealth during their working years, in
order to generate income during their retirement years, have
changed.  Although employer-sponsored retirement plans will still
provide an important source of retirement income in the future, as-
sets held in individual savings accounts will likely be the largest source
of non–Social Security retirement income.207  Consequently, the un-
derlying justification for designating the Department of Labor as the
primary source for worker retirement financial education—the De-
partment’s regulation of the employer-employee relationship in the
workplace—is less compelling.  Finally, the conflict of interest be-
tween the Department of Labor’s primary regulatory role under ER-
ISA and its role as a public educator calls into question the
Department’s ability to function as a vigorous and effective advocate
for personal savings and investment.208
Although critics may contend that the nature of the Department
of Labor’s current conflict of interest is not significant enough to war-
rant a change, or that Congress should not designate any federal
agency to serve in a public education role, such criticism concerns the
larger issue of the federal government’s role and function.  Without
attempting to resolve that much larger debate, this Article has at-
tempted to show that financial illiteracy and a lack of retirement fi-
nancial planning is a significant social policy problem in an
environment where one’s retirement financial security is increasingly
dependent on individual saving and investment efforts.  Given the
scope and magnitude of the problem, it is doubtful that it will be re-
solved either by the voluntary efforts of employers or by the marketing
efforts of the financial services industry.  This is a problem of national
magnitude and thus requires a federal solution.
Some critics may counter that the Social Security Administration
does not currently have the internal expertise to become the preemi-
204 See supra text accompanying note 113. R
205 See 29 U.S.C. § 1147(a) (2000).
206 For background and a report on the last of the three summits, which was held in
2006, see 2006 National Saver Summit, http://www.saversummit.dol.gov/2006summit.
html (last visited Oct. 20, 2006).
207 See supra text accompanying note 125.
208 See discussion supra Part I.C.2.
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nent government source for retirement planning information, educa-
tional materials, and financial planning tools.  Yet an abundance of
specialized expertise exists in academia,209 the private sector,210 and
nonprofit public service organizations.211  This expertise could be in-
jected into the Social Security Administration to further its role as a
public educator on retirement saving.  Consequently, the real barrier
to transforming the role of the Social Security Administration is not a
lack of available expertise, but rather attitudinal, political, and fiscal
obstacles.
D. Potential Objections to the Proposal and Responses
Interjecting any new idea into the national policy debate regard-
ing the future of Social Security is likely to prove controversial, as the
issue of reforming Social Security generates strong opinions.212  This
last subpart of the Article anticipates objections to my proposal and
provides some initial responses.
Critics of the proposal may assert that retirement financial educa-
tion, like youth, is wasted on the young.  According to the life-cycle
hypothesis of retirement saving, young workers have less income and
tend to allocate their earnings toward housing and child-care costs.213
A mounting body of empirical research, however, contradicts the no-
tion that young workers cannot afford to save for retirement.214  At
least two recent empirical studies have shown that when young work-
ers do participate in employer 401(k) plans, they save at contribution
levels (measured as a percentage of compensation) that are similar to
the contribution levels of older workers.215  In other words, although
209 For example, numerous scholars from various academic fields are affiliated with
such research entities as the Pension Research Council at the University of Pennsylvania’s
Wharton School, the Center for Retirement Research at Boston College, and the National
Health and Retirement Study at the University of Michigan.
210 For example, TIAA-CREF, Vanguard, and Fidelity all have active internal research
programs.
211 Examples of expertise in the nonprofit sector include EBRI, which sponsors the
American Savings Education Council, the American Association of Retired Persons
(AARP), and the Pension Rights Center.
212 Political observers refer to Social Security as the “third rail” of American politics—
an issue with which politicians should not tamper. See, e.g., Martha Derthick & Steven M.
Teles, Riding the Third Rail: Social Security Reform, in THE REAGAN PRESIDENCY: PRAGMATIC
CONSERVATISM AND ITS LEGACIES 182 (W. Elliot Brownlee & Hugh Davis Graham eds.,
2003).
213 See MUNNELL & SUNDE´N, supra note 1, at 34 (describing the life-cycle hypothesis). R
214 See, e.g., Marjorie Honig & Irena Dushi, How Demographic Change Will Drive Benefits
Design, in BENEFITS FOR THE WORKPLACE OF THE FUTURE, supra note 35, at 58, 62; MUNNELL R
& SUNDE´N, supra note 1, at 34–35. R
215 See Honig & Dushi, supra note 214, at 62; MUNNELL & SUNDE´N, supra note 1, at R
34–35.  Based on their analysis of data from the 2001 Survey of Consumer Finances, Mun-
nell and Sunde´n question the validity of the life-cycle hypothesis of retirement financial
planning. See MUNNELL & SUNDE´N, supra note 1, at 34–35.  Munnell and Sunde´n argue that R
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these young workers may not save as much in absolute dollar terms as
older workers, their relative retirement savings rates are similar once
the young workers decide to participate.  The key difference is that
young workers tend to cash out their 401(k) plan savings when they
change employers, whereas older workers tend to roll over their
401(k) plan savings to an IRA or their new employers’ retirement
plans.216  Cashing out a small amount is consistent with the psycholog-
ical bias that discounts the future and suggests that young workers
may not fully appreciate the income tax and long-term investment
consequences of failing to elect a rollover.217
Critics may also question whether education will change behav-
ior.  There are several research experiments suggesting reasons for
skepticism.218  In these experiments, the study participants attended a
one-time financial education seminar,219 or completed a survey that
informed them about the benefits of their employers’ retirement sav-
ings plans.220  The researchers then examined the investment deci-
sions of the participants in the experiment and found that attending
the seminar or reading about retirement plans had little influence on
subsequent investment behavior.221
Other scholars who have examined the problem of financial illit-
eracy posit that the design and content of the financial education pro-
grams used in these experimental seminars may not be adequate to
address the underlying problem of acute financial illiteracy.  These
researchers suggest that such seminars might have had only a minimal
effect on saving behavior due to the lack of “well-targeted content,” or
because “if financial illiteracy is widespread among particular employ-
ees, a one-time financial education lesson is likely to be insufficient to
influence planning and saving decisions.”222
the life-cycle hypothesis is contrary to data showing that eligible workers contribute at a
relatively consistent rate to their 401(k) plans after age thirty. See id. at 35.  Honig and
Dushi’s study reaches a similar conclusion. See Honig & Dushi, supra note 214, at 62; see R
also MCGILL ET AL., supra note 1, at 402 (describing the life-cycle theory as “a reasonable R
description of how the business and professional classes funded their retirement during
the late eighteenth century”).
216 See MUNNELL & SUNDE´N, supra note 1, at 133. R
217 See id. at 131–36 (illustrating the impact on accumulated retirement wealth from
taxable distributions).
218 See James J. Choi et al., $100 Bills on the Sidewalk: Suboptimal Saving in 401(k) Plans
13-18 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11554, 2005) [hereinafter Bills
on the Sidewalk]; James J. Choi et al., Defined Contribution Pensions: Plan Rules, Participant
Decisions, and the Path of Least Resistance 30–31 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 8655, 2001) [hereinafter Defined Contribution Pensions].
219 See Defined Contribution Pensions, supra note 218, at 30. R
220 See Bills on the Sidewalk, supra note 218, at 13–14. R
221 See id. at 18; Defined Contribution Pensions, supra note 218, at 31. R
222 Lusardi & Mitchell, supra note 37, at 16–17.  In a separate article, Lusardi elabo- R
rates on why the studies casting doubt on the effectiveness of financial education should be
viewed cautiously:
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These research experiments contrast with the results of other ex-
periments, which found that peer pressure, that bane of parents of
teenagers, actually may be a blessing in terms of persuading young
workers to save.223  In these experiments, researchers found that so-
cial interactions among co-workers in the workplace who had received
financial education might have improved retirement saving among
their co-workers who had not received the financial education.224
These research experiments suggest that peer pressure among young
workers could enhance the impact of a youth-oriented public finan-
cial education campaign.225  Of course, peer pressure can also have a
negative influence on behavior.  But the potential for negative peer
influence lends even more support to the idea of a widespread public
education campaign targeting young workers through the Social Se-
curity Administration’s existing “Save for Your Future” correspon-
dence with workers.
Another potential criticism of the proposal is that a public educa-
tion campaign led by the Social Security Administration may under-
mine public confidence in the Social Security system.  For workers
today, however, confidence in the future receipt of Social Security
benefits has already eroded due to the program’s well-publicized fiscal
How can we interpret this mixed evidence?  If the findings [of the re-
search experiments] are correct, one has to be very cautious in interpreting
the effects of financial education on savings.  First, if financial illiteracy is
widespread and individuals do not know how interest rates and inflation
work, attending a benefit fair is unlikely to affect behavior.  Similarly a one-
time exposure to financial education may do little to affect savings.  This is
not because financial education is ineffective but because the “cure is not
adequate for the disease.”  Moreover, the fact that individuals have difficul-
ties following through their actions is perhaps an argument for changing
the design of financial education programs rather than dismissing their im-
portance.  One of the lessons we have learned from the literature on saving
is that there is large heterogeneity in saving behavior.  Individuals seem to
differ widely in their degree of financial literacy as well.  A “one-size-fits-all”
education program may do little to stimulate saving and may itself be one
of the major disincentives to attend a financial education program.  Most
importantly, very little information is usually provided about the content of
retirement seminars.  For example, the HRS data does not provide informa-
tion on what was covered in seminars or even when they were attended.  To
best evaluate the effects of seminars, we need to have a good understanding
of the obstacles people face when planning for retirement.  Designing fi-
nancial programs and evaluating those programs is thus intimately inter-
twined with understanding the determinants of saving and planning and
the presence or absence of financial literacy.
Lusardi, supra note 37 (manuscript at 13–14) (citations omitted). R
223 See Esther Duflo & Emmanuel Saez, Implications of Pension Plan Features, Information,
and Social Interactions for Retirement Saving Decisions, in PENSION DESIGN AND STRUCTURE,
supra note 16, at 139–46. R
224 See id. at 145–46.
225 See id.
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problems.226  Transforming the role of the Social Security Administra-
tion as proposed would not be an admission that the Social Security
system is failing; rather, it would be a candid admission of the reality
of future retirement income security—a reality that has shifted sharply
toward greater individual responsibility.
Ultimately, criticisms of the proposal may come down to the ques-
tion of how to finance a public motivational and educational cam-
paign aimed at encouraging young workers to save and invest for
retirement.  Closely related to concerns over funding is a cost-benefit
analysis argument: how can policy makers know that an investment in
public retirement financial education today will lead to a more secure
retirement for workers in the future?
In terms of a funding source, in 2005, payroll tax revenues for the
Old-Age and Survivors Insurance Fund component of the Social Se-
curity program were estimated at $604.3 billion.227  Allocating
one–one thousandth of a single year’s payroll tax revenues to funding
the proposal would provide over $600 million, or six times the
amount that was available to the American Legacy Foundation.228
The remaining question for policymakers is whether investing So-
cial Security payroll tax revenues in a public motivational and educa-
tional campaign is sound policy with respect to a cost-benefit analysis.
Providing a definitive cost-benefit analysis with existing empirical data
is impossible because the current national data sets do not provide
sufficient information concerning the type, content, and quality of the
retirement financial planning seminars the survey respondents at-
tended.229  But one study of the complete national HRS data set sug-
gests both reason for optimism and a need for further research.230
This study, which used macro-level data and multiple-regression analy-
sis, found that attendance at a retirement financial planning seminar
increased financial wealth significantly, particularly among lower-in-
come and less educated workers.231
Overall, attending seminars appears to increase financial wealth by
approximately 18 percent . . . .  This effect derives mainly from the
bottom of the distribution, where wealth increased by more than 70
percent.  The effect is also large for those with least education with
increases in financial wealth close to 100 percent. . . .
226 See Helman et al., supra note 52, at 18–19 (“Fewer than 1 in 10 workers say they are R
very confident that the Social Security system will continue to provide benefits of at least
equal value to the benefits received by retirees today . . . .”).
227 2006 ANNUAL REPORTS, supra note 3, at 1. R
228 See discussion supra Part II.B (noting that out of the $1.45 billion settlement, the
foundation used $100 million as part of the truthSM campaign).
229 See Lusardi, supra note 37 (manuscript at 13–14). R
230 Lusardi, supra note 41, at 167–68. R
231 See id.
\\server05\productn\C\CRN\92-2\CRN207.txt unknown Seq: 38 26-DEC-06 15:55
360 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92:323
Results for net worth show a similar pattern.  Attending a retire-
ment seminar increases net worth in the sample by approximately 6
percent.  Again, the effect is mostly coming from those at the bot-
tom of the net worth distribution. . . .
. . . [T]hese estimates may be a lower bound of the effectiveness
of retirement seminars . . . .232
The author of this study concluded:
While the provision of information and the reduction of plan-
ning costs could play an important role in improving the financial
security of many US households, it should be recalled that only a
small number of workers currently attends retirement seminars.
Consequently, many remain untouched by employers’ efforts to
provide financial education.  This fact represents an important
topic for future research and a challenge for policymakers.233
There is much more to be gleaned from further research in this
area.234  But the empirical research indicates that the potential bene-
fits of a public financial literacy and retirement financial planning
campaign are likely to far outweigh its costs.235
Finally, critics may assert that transforming the role of the Social
Security Administration would divert scarce political capital away from
other, more ambitious proposals, such as restoring the Social Security
system to financial solvency, increasing benefit levels to strengthen the
social safety net, and reforming the private employer-sponsored retire-
ment plan system to increase the scope of coverage and boost the level
of plan benefits.  Yet advocating for a transformation in the role of the
Social Security Administration is not “giving up” on other needed
changes in national retirement policy.  Certainly, some individuals do
not have discretionary income, and for them the guaranteed monthly
income provided by Social Security is a crucial social safety net.  Cer-
tainly, other structural and market regulatory changes are needed to
strengthen the private employer pension system and to increase the
transparency of the financial services industry to unsophisticated in-
vestors.  In the current political environment, however, the perfect is
the enemy of the good.  Time is passing, and with it passes the oppor-
tunity for young workers to improve their future prospects for a suffi-
cient retirement income through saving and sound financial
planning.
232 Id. at 168.
233 Id. at 171.
234 See id. at 171–72.
235 See id.
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CONCLUSION
Social Security benefits were never designed to be one’s sole
source of retirement income.  Due to fiscal constraints, it is likely that
Social Security benefits in the future will be less generous when the
young workers of today retire.  In the future, retirement income secur-
ity will depend heavily on wealth accumulated during one’s working
years.  The role of the Social Security Administration must be trans-
formed to one of motivating, informing, and educating the young
workers of today about retirement financial planning so that they can
adequately plan and prepare for a financially secure retirement
tomorrow.
\\server05\productn\C\CRN\92-2\CRN207.txt unknown Seq: 40 26-DEC-06 15:55
362 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92:323
